

31 December 1953

YES ONLY

Kirk's Memo

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: DD/P Organization

1. As one of the "fathers" of merger, I feel obliged to report that in my view the merger we now have is not what we want. As Inspector General, I am compelled to advise that I believe organizational changes are necessary for reasons of efficiency, economy, and operational soundness.

2. It should be noted that merger was started in an evolutionary manner. AD/SO and AD/PC agreed that certain services could best be performed as services of common concern, thus: Operational Aids Division of SO and Research and Development of PC became TSS; SO took over both Registries in the RI Division; SO established as a service to both offices for developing commercial cover the Cover Division; PC established the Air-Maritime Division to support both offices, etc. Secondly, it was agreed that area divisions would be merged gradually starting with NE where there was immediate agreement on Roosevelt as Chief. It was agreed that the branches would be merged as appropriate and as qualified branch chiefs could be chosen.

3. Due to this evolutionary method of merging it was recognized that the initial results would be an irrational organization. But it was never assumed, certainly not by the undersigned, that this organization would be permitted to continue to exist—but would itself evolve into a single staff system, with the staffs exercising purely "staff" functions in the true sense of the word and the command and action function would become centralized in the area divisions. This certainly was envisioned as the divisions were permitted to organize with staffs—some of them fairly sizeable—of their own.

4. Consequently, the situation which has developed is one in which we have a large, irrational staff structure—which exercises command functions and "operates"—superimposed over the area divisions, each with their own integrated staffs. The result is not only one of duplication of effort, conflicting command authorities, division of responsibility and dilution of effort, but also of the entire field organization which is rapidly despairing of ever getting prompt action on anything from headquarters except in emergencies or "flaps."

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5. Prior to dealing with some of the problems of the present organization, there are certain feelings and philosophies that should be mentioned as contributory to the present situation. The bitterness of feeling between certain segments and certain levels of SO and PC should not be underestimated. Warner did not dispel this feeling--it now takes the form of former PC personnel feeling that former SO personnel are in the driver's seat and there is discrimination against ex-PC. There has always been a strong trade-union feeling among SO personnel. While esprit de corps is commendable, this SO attitude goes beyond that and takes an intolerant, unimaginative, negative attitude against persons and activities that do not conform to the SO pattern. Not to be overlooked is the bitter feeling that existed between DD/A and DD/P--a feeling that was never aided by the oft-expressed view of the former DD/A that he alone was safeguarding the DCI's interest. This latent hostility between the two major components is still an important factor in the organization of the DD/P structure. For, on the one side, the DD/P area is organized to help itself because it neither trusts nor relies on the DD/A area to perform their functions (an attitude that too often in the past has been justified), and in the DD/A area there is distrust of the operators, the aforementioned attitude that all flaps start with DD/P, and a tendency to attempt to take over, rather than assist in, anything that they are brought in on. Most simply stated, the DD/A organization rather than trying to find quick, uncomplicated, easy solutions to DD/P problems still appears to be obsessed only with the mission of erecting as many safeguards and regimented rules of procedure as can be devised. This trend, if continued, will soon eliminate any flexibility and require "operators" to be guardhouse lawyers if they want to be operating safely. The final factor that should be mentioned is the basic one of the growth of bureaucracy. Each of the existing staffs and divisions have their entrenched bureaucrats who will oppose any change as endangering their positions and privileges.

6. Here are some of the incongruities of the present DD/P organization--as can be seen graphically in the chart, Annex I. (All figures used are on-duty personnel.)

25X1

a. There are seven principal staffs ranging in size from

25X1

Seven Staffs:

	IAR
	PPC
	Admin
	FI
	PM
	PP
	TSS
	Total

b. These are supervised over seven area divisions ranging in size from []

25X1

Seven Area Divisions:

25X1

[]	EE
	FE
	NE
	WE
	SE
	SR
	WI
	TOTAL

c. Five of the staffs have subordinate divisions which total 24 in number;

d. Subordinate divisions under staffs range from one under DD/P Admin to 13 in TSS; and in numbers of personnel from [] in Logistics Division of PM and Water-Air Division of TSS to [] in RI Division of FI;

25X1

25X1

e. In addition to subordinate divisions, two of the staffs have subordinate staffs, totalling eight, one in PP and seven in FI;

f. In addition to all of the above, it must be taken into account the fact that each of the area divisions has its own set of staffs--see Annex II for the chart of one division alone, FE. Here are staffs totalling [] persons (or nearly one-third of the [] in headquarters);

25X1

25X1

g. To take one phase of the organization alone, Administration, note that in Annex I there is a DD/P Admin Staff of [], a FI Admin Staff of [], a PM Admin Division of [], a TSS Admin Division of []--or a total of four units and [] persons in the top staff structure of DD/P alone in administration. A glance at Annex II will indicate that FE Division alone has an Admin Staff of [] (each of the other six area divisions also has an administrative staff);

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

h. The multiplicity of organizations at the different levels indicated for Administration could also be shown for FI, PP, and PM;

25X1

i. Not to be ignored are the statistics showing [] persons in the staffs alone in Washington before even area division headquarters are considered;

j. In summation, there are seven area divisions, seven principal staffs, 24 subordinate divisions and eight subordinate staffs in the DD/P complex or a total of 46 major units.

7. There should be certain assumptions granted before any organizational concept for the DD/P area is valid. These are:

a. That the primary missions of the organization must be conducted in a clandestine fashion;

b. that the chain of command is exercised through the area divisions and branches to the field stations;

c. that with limited personnel and facilities to accomplish our mission the operating executives will be provided a list of priorities by area branch and station for the utilization of their assets; i.e., (1) penetration of any Soviet mission, (2) penetration of the Communist Party; (3) action to support anti-communist groups, (4) action to support European unity, etc.

8. While this does not purport to be a completed staff study, it nevertheless seems appropriate to advance a suggested organization--see Annex III. Under this proposed organization the DD/P, his immediate No. 2--COP, and their two principal assistants, Deputy (or Assistant) for FI, and Deputy (or Assistant) for PP, would be responsible for all activities of the Clandestine organization, with the next in the chain of command being the division chief (and through him the branch chief) to the station chief overseas. In other words, the three key men for all activities in [] would be DD/P, Chief EE, Senior Representative

There would be five principal staffs, as indicated in the chart--Operations, Plans, Administration, Operational Support and Intelligence Support. The chart (Annex III) indicates the present components that would be grouped under the new staffs. Two of these staffs require special comment.

a. Into an Operational Support Staff would be grouped those components which exist solely to provide the tools for operations:



b. An Intelligence Support Staff would group together all of the handling of the information collected, or the information needed for operations. This staff would serve a vital function in the DD/P area of constantly keeping the end product in the eyes of the operators; and acting as an impartial judge of the results.

It should be noted that PM is excluded. If CIA is to continue peacetime activities in this field, they will be primarily of a war planning nature and should be carried on as part of the Plans Staff.

It should also be noted that the I&R Staff and PPC Staff are excluded. The first according to DD/P combines two functions--that of inspection and that of operational review. The inspection function belongs to the Inspector General, and I do not believe we are a big enough or sufficiently wealthy organization to afford the luxury of allowing our components to inspect themselves. The operational review function should be either grouped with the PPC functions and made part of the immediate DD/P staff or abolished. I question whether such a function doesn't in effect relieve the division and branch chiefs of their primary responsibility for constant and recurrent review of their own operations.

9. Although Annex III might seem to indicate that such a proposed organization would simply regroup staffs and divisions, its main accomplishment would be to allow a major economy in manpower, a reduction in the T/O, and a saving of considerable money. Here are just a few of the economies that could be effected:

a. Valuable executive manpower would be conserved; (as one item for consideration, it should be noted that each division now has a Chief, Deputy Chief, Chief FI, Chief PP--and some have, in addition, Chiefs of Operations and Executive Secretaries. Simplified organization plus an indication of priority of mission could eliminate the specialized chiefs.)

10. Also to be considered in effecting any reorganization is whether the SR Division is a proper concept, is pulling its weight, and should be continued in its present form. In my opinion, this "noble experiment" has failed. It came into being mainly because the other divisions were not devoting sufficient attention to Soviet targets. This failure can be avoided by assignment of priority of mission, with the assets of the SR Division located in the appropriate divisions. This would also eliminate the problems created by the SR Division always operating out of the territory of the other divisions.

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
Inspector General